Thurles Information

Serious questions must be answered about the Government’s decision to exclude the FalconEye enhanced-vision system from Ireland’s new €53 million Dassault Falcon 6X.

Delivered shortly before Christmas 2025, the aircraft replaced the increasingly unreliable Learjet. It is not merely a ministerial transport. The State acquired it as a multi-purpose Strategic Reach Aircraft capable of undertaking long-distance medical evacuations, repatriating Irish citizens and Defence Forces personnel, and supporting operations in hostile or hazardous locations.

While I haven’t been on board myself; inside the cabin fit-out is understood to show cream coloured executive-style seating, polished wood panelling, cabin tables, and sofa-style seating.

Multiple sources have now reported, that the FalconEye Enhanced-Vision System has been omitted because its acquisition would have required the Irish State to enter into an agreement with its Israeli manufacturer, Elbit Systems.

FalconEye uses cameras, infrared sensors and synthetic imagery to give pilots substantially greater situational awareness in darkness, fog and other low-visibility conditions. Dassault says the system can reveal runways, lighting, airport structures and potential obstacles during final approach. An Air Corps pilot has explained that its practical advantage is enabling landings in weather conditions in which aircraft without it may have to divert.

This does not mean the Falcon 6X is unsafe or incapable of operating in poor weather. The Department of Defence insists that there are “no current limits on the operational capability of the aircraft.” Nevertheless, aviation sources say the omission reduces the options available to pilots in difficult conditions. That distinction demands examination, not evasive wording.

Political and ethical procurement policies are legitimate matters for government. But where a decision may affect the capability of an aircraft used for medical evacuation, emergency transport and the rescue of citizens, operational requirements and expert safety advice must be transparent and demonstrably paramount.

The Government should now disclose who authorised the omission, what operational and safety assessments were obtained, what alternatives were considered, and whether the consequences for emergency missions were fully evaluated. It should also explain the apparent inconsistency whereby other recently acquired Air Corps aircraft reportedly contain Israeli-manufactured technology considered integral to their operation.

Claims that this decision breaches EU procurement law should now be examined independently. Any decision regarding the aircraft’s procurement specification, including the reported request to exclude FalconEye, would have arisen within the Department of Defence procurement process during Mr Micheál Martin’s tenure. (Contract dated December 18th 2024).
However, we are unable to establish which individual minister or government official personally authorised that particular exclusion.

This is not principally an argument about Israel. It is about responsible procurement, public safety and democratic accountability. On those matters, the Government owes the public clear answers not carefully constructed silence.